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Chapter 6

Are Women Conservative Investors?
Gender Differences in ParticipantDirected Pension Investments
Richard P. Hinz, David D. McCarthy, and
John A. Turner

The rise in United States private-sector pension coverage during the
1980s and early 1990s was primarily attributable to the growth of 401 (k)
plans. In 1983,401 (k) plans covered 6 percent of participants in private
pension plans; ten years later they covered 46 percent (USDOL 1994).
Participation declined in both defined benefit plans and non-401 (k) defined contribution plans during this period.
A common feature of 401 (k) plans, and increasingly of other defined
con tribution plans, is that participants may direct the investment of some
portion of their account. 1 In 1991, medium and large firms reported
that 91 percent of participants in savings and thrift plans could direct
the investment of participant contributions and 62 percent could direct the investment of employer contributions."
Investment funds managed by individual pension participants allow
participants to consider a range of investment strategies, selecting portfolios suited to their time horizon and risk tolerance. The shift toward
individual management may, however, have adverse effects. Individuals
may be too conservative, allocating to short-term, fixed-income assets a
share of their portfolio inconsistent with specialists' views as to the optimal mix for a pension portfolio (EBPR 1993). In a survey, 69 percent of
working Americans said that if they had to choose how to invest their
pension money knowing that their benefits would go up with investment
gains and down with investment losses, they would prefer low-risk, lowreturn investments (EBRI 1993). An increasingly prominent interpreta-
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tion is that this preference results from financial naivete. This study uses
a new data set on the federal Thrift Savings Plan (TSP) to explore these
and other hypotheses.

Prior Studies on Gender Differences in Investments
Investment decisions may differ by sex for several reasons. One possibility is that women know less and are less confident about their knowledge
of investments as compared to men (New York Life Insurance Company
1993). Other surveys suggest that women are also more conservative investors than men. One study of business students found females less
likely to take business risks than males (Zinkhan and Karande 1991).
Using the 1989 Survey of Consumer Finances, a different team reported
that 57 percent of women said they were unwilling to take any financial risks, compared to 41 percent of men (Jianakopolos and Bernasek
1994). That study found no significant gender differences, however, after controlling for savings, home ownership, and other assets. A different
analysis of investor styles based on a questionnaire sent to clients of a
large brokerage firm concluded that investor age, income, and sex in
descending order were the primary determinants of investor style, with
women being more conservative (Lewellen, Lease, and Schlarbaum
1977). Finally, a recent nationally represen tative survey concerning willingness to take ajob with the potential for higher earnings but the risk
of lower earnings found that women were more risk averse (Barsky, Juster, Kimball, and Shapiro 1995).
One caveat to these conclusions is that individuals' responses to questionnaires may differ from their actual behavior, with men and women
being distinguished by what they consider a "socially acceptable" response. Nevertheless, a recent exploration of individual asset allocation
and risk aversion patterns concluded that women are overall slightly
more risk averse than men (Riley and Chow 1992). That report speculated that this could be due to differences in age, income, and wealth
rather than gender, but they did not test that hypothesis in a multivariate
framework. In a companion piece to the present one, VanDerhei and
Bajtelsmit (this volume) found that women were more likely to invest
in fixed-income securities and less likely to invest in employer stock
than men.
If women invest in lower-risk pension portfolios than men, growing
reliance on participant-directed individual account plans could worsen
existing retirement income disparities by gender. For new pensioners in
1993 to 1994 the median of women's benefits was 50 percent less than
men's (USDOL 1995: 20).
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Explanations for Gender Differences in Risk Preferences
To explore further possible explanations for why women and men differ
in the amount of financial risk they hold, we consider a range of arguments. First, women and men may differ in their underlying attitudes or
utility functions for risk. For example, cultural factors may cause men to
bear more risk than women. Second, gender differences in risk bearing
might be due to differences in economic status. For example, women
often have lower earnings than men. If higher income workers were
more willing to bear risk, a gender difference in risk bearing could be
due to a difference in income. A third hypothesis is that differences in
risk bearing could be due to gender differences in information. To the
extent that males are better informed about investments, this might explain their willingness to bear more risk. Fourth, women's longer life expectancy and greater probability of outliving their spouses could affect
their willingness to accept financial risk. If individuals with a longer time
horizon have a greater ability to bear risk, women would be expected to
hold riskier portfolios than men.

Testing the Hypotheses
To pursue these hypotheses in an empirical setting, we use data from a
1990 survey of participants in the federal government's Thrift Savings
Plan (TSP) for federal employees. This plan had assets of approximately US $27 billion as ofJanuary 1995, making it one of the 20 largest
pension funds in the nation after less than ten years' existence (USGAO
1995, Pensions and Investments 1995). With 2 million participants, the
TSP is projected to become the largest pension fund in the United States
(Chernoff 1990).
Created during the 1986 reform of the federal retirement system, the
TSP covers most federal employees hired after January 1, 1984. Participants in the preexisting Civil Service Retirement System were also given
the option of joining the new system. Workers covered under the new
TSP system also participate in the Federal Employees Retirement System
(FERS), which is a defined benefit pension plan, and in the national
Social Security system.
The federal government automatically contributes 1 percent of salary
to the Thrift Savings Plan for all FERS employees. For workers who also
contribute additional pre-tax amounts from their salary, the federal government matches these contributions up to 5 percent of pay-dollar for
dollar for the first 3 percent and 50 cents per dollar for the next 2 percent, for a maximum government contribution of 5 percent. In 1990,
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three quarters of male and 62 percent of female FERS employees contributed part of their salary to the Thrift Savings Plan.'
The TSP has three funds in which participants may invest. First, the
G fund holds short-term nonmarketable United States Treasury securities specially issued to the plan. By law, the interest rate on these investments equals the average of market rates of return on United States
Treasury marketable securities outstanding with four or more years to
maturity. Because of the longer maturity and greater interest rate risk
than on Treasury bills, the G fund earns a higher rate of return than
Treasury bills.
The second fund available to TSP participants is the F fund, a fixedincome index fund of government and corporate bonds. Over the period of 1988 to 1990 this fund invested primarily in a commingled
Shearson Lehman Hutton Government/Corporate bond index fund. In
dollar terms, the United States Government sector comprised 74 percent
of the index and corporate bonds the remaining 26 percent. This fixedincome fund has greater risk than the government securities G fund because of its longer maturity (and thus greater interest rate risk) and
because it includes corporate bonds with default risk.
The third option open to TSP participants is the C fund that invests in
common stocks in the form of a Standard & Poor's (S&P) 500 index
fund. The C fund invests passively, closely matching the performance of
the S&P 500 index. Over the period ofl980 to 1989, rates of return were
II percent for the government bond fund, 12.2 percent for the fixedincome fund, and 17.4 percent for the stock fund.
The agency managing the TSP, known as the Thrift Savings Board,
conducted a survey in 1990 to learn more abou t the effectiveness of the
Board's publications informing employees about the plan. This survey
was also matched with administrative records on covered employees.'
These data have not been used previously to analyze differences across
workers in risk bearing. Because the data on the investment of pension
contributions and worker earnings are based on administrative records,
they are highly reliable. Unfortunately, the survey lacks information on
worker educational attainment and family asset holdings.
Turning to the evidence, we note that FERS employees could allocate
a maximum of 60 percent of their own contributions to the common
stock and fixed-income funds in 1990. 5 Our tabulations (see Table 1)
indicate that women and men differed greatly in the probability of investing in common stock during that year. Only 28 percent of women,
compared to 45 percent of men, participated in the common stock fund
under the TSP. Of those respondents participating in that fund, the gender difference in the percentage of contributions allocated to common

Richard P. Hinz, David D. McCarthy, John A. Turner
TABLE 1

95

Descriptive Statistics on TSP Participants

Description

Percent Contributing to:
CorF
C but notF
Fbut notC
Fraction of Funds in C Fund
All Participants
Contributors Only
Fraction of Funds in F Fund
All Participants
Contributors Only
Fraction of Funds in G Fund
Average Salary (US $)
Other Income
Married (%)
Average Age (years)
Sample Size

Women

Men

Total

33%
28
12

48%
45
20

44%
40
18

8.9%
(16.7)
31.2
(16.8)

15.3%
(21.2)
34.4
(18.9)

13.4%
(20.2)
33.7%
(18.5)

2.6%
(7.7)
2Ll
(10.2)
88.6%
(19.8)
$35,614
(19,681)
$19,582
(19,222)
0.58
38.9
(10.2)
148

8.8%
(8.8)
18.5
(10.6)
81.0%
(23.3)
$46,706
(19,995)
$14,768
(13,383)
0.81
40.9
(ILl)
350

3.4%
(8.5)
19.0
(10.5)
83.2%
(22.6)
$43,410
(20,520)
$16,198
(15,489)
0.74
40.3
(10.8)
498

Notes: Statistics given for the regression sample (unweighted); they do not represent population statistics. All participants required to contribute to the G fund, so statistics on the
percentage contributing to that fund not presented. Standard deviations in parentheses.

stock was slight-on average 31 percent for women and 34 percent for
men. All agency automatic and matching contributions were restricted
to the government bond fund.
It is next of in terest to ask whether the observed gender difference in
portfolio allocations persists after controlling for economic and demographic variables available in the survey. That is, one might hypothesize
no pure gender difference in risk bearing-the observed differences are
due to differences in economic and demographic characteristics. The
particular controls available here are salary, other family income, age,
gender, and marital status (married/not married).6 However our analysis decisively rejects the hypothesis. That is, holding constant the worker's salary and other family income, men are still more likely to invest in
the common stock and fixed-income funds than women. The analysis
also shows that rising salary and other family income increases
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the likelihood that a worker invests in the common stock or fixedincome funds. However, the effect of own salary is 10 times greater than
other family income. This result is similar to results reported by Bernheim and Garrett (1995) concerning participation in 401 (k) plans. They
found that spouse's earnings had little effect on the respondent's own
participation, and that the respondent's earnings had little effect on the
spouse's participation.
Because Social Security replaces a higher percentage of earnings for
low-paid workers than for high earners and because Social Security presumably is viewed as low risk, it might be thought that low earners would
be more willing than high earners to accept risk. In fact, the reverse was
found among TSP participants. Higher earners were significantly more
likely to contribute to the common stock fund than lower earners. Our
survey did not supply information on the workers' entire portfolios, but
most Americans hold no financial assets outside their pension plans, so
we believe that we have not omitted important controls from the analysis. Even among households with income of US $50,000 or more, only
49 percent owned stocks (Kennickell and Shack-Marquez 1992).
Because marriage provides insurance through income pooling, with
the employment possibilities of husbands and wives generally subject to
different risks, married couples might be thought willing to take greater
risk even after holding constant family income. Complicating factors are
that married people have longer life expectancies than do nonmarried
people and are more likely to have child dependents, but the direction
of these effects is unclear. 7
When we use the TSP sample to compare investment decisions by
marital status, we compare people who are currently married to people
who are single for whatever reason (divorced, never married, widowed).
The results clearly show that marriage has a significan tly negative effect;
that is, married people were much less likely to invest either in stock or
the fixed-income portfolio. The effect of marriage on differing individual risk bearing for men and women was also investigated, on the
view that perhaps marriage might reduce gender differences in risk
bearing, oppositely affecting the risk bearing of men and women.
This investigation, however, shows that married men and unmarried
women take similar investment risks. Married women are the most conservative, and unmarried men are the least conservative. In other words
marriage appears not to reduce the gender gap in risk bearing. An alternative interpretation would view the married couple as a unit, finding
that the combined husband-wife portfolio is intermediate in risk between the portfolios of the two people acting as single individuals. Thus
by this interpretation, marriage bridges the gender gap in financial risk
bearing. s
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The estimated effect of marriage on risk bearing may shed light on the
gender gap in risk bearing. The gender gap in risk bearing that remains
after holding constant demographic and economic variables is unexplained in our data; however, a major gender difference that has not
been measured directly is the gender difference in mortality risk. The
gender difference in mortality risk is roughly equal to the marital status
difference in mortality risk, and both gender and marital status have
roughly the same magnitude of effect on risk bearing. This pattern suggests the interpretation that the gender difference in risk bearing is
caused by the gender difference in mortality risk, with people that have
lower mortality risk taking less financial risk.
Age differences could also affect willingness to bear financial risk. One
argument is that those nearing retirement should place more retirement
in fixed income. However Bodie (1995) argues that young workers with
a long time horizon should not invest a large share of their portfolio in
stocks. Another issue is that financial sophistication may increase with
age and experience. In our analysis of the survey (see Table 3 below), we
find that age generally is not a good predictor of asset allocation preferences except in investment in fixed-income securities where its effect is
negative. 9
One interesting fact discerned in the TSP survey is that a large percentage of the sample, 65 percent of women and 52 percent of men,
invested only in the government bond fund. Several factors may explain
this investment behavior. First, the Thrift Savings Plan statute required
that all employee contributions had to be invested in the G fund in 1987.
This requirement decreased each year by 20 percent through 1990 and
was eliminated in 1991. Some employees who were invested entirely in
the G fund may have not taken advantage of the opportunity to move
out of the bond fund merely due to inertia. For other employees, the
initial restrictions may have had a chilling effect on their willingness to
invest in other funds. Second, by 1990, workers who had been in the
Thrift Savings Plan only a short time may have invested in the least risky
portfolio, preferring a conservative approach initially. As they learned
more about the different funds through information provided them by
the Thrift Savings Board, they would have had the chance to move to
riskier investments. Nevertheless, when we investigated these hypotheses, none of them were borne ouL 'O
An alternative explanation for why many participants invested in the
minimum-risk portfolio is that some would have preferred a fund with
even lower risk, for example, a fund with no real interest rate risk. This
possibility is explored using a statistical technique known as a Tobit estimation procedure, and we posit that some workers fully invested in the
government bond fund might have preferred an even more conservative
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fund had one been available. In results not explored in detail here, this
appears to be true for women in that more women than men would appear to prefer even less risky assets." On the whole, we find that women
would be predicted to have held 15 percent less in stock funds than men
using this Tobit approach, double the estimate using simpler statistical
techniques.
It should be noted that some TSP participants bunch at the opposite
extreme, selecting the most risky portfolio available. Specifically 11 percent of men and 5 percent of women invested the maximum percentage
in common stock, suggesting that some would have preferred an even
riskier portfolio had that been available. 12 For workers having the maximum or minimum risk portfolio within the plan and for whom their
pension portfolio is their entire financial investment portfolio, the restrictions on risk bearing within the plan are therefore likely to be binding. By contrast, workers who also had financial investments outside their
pension portfolio could adjust the risk of their overall portfolio by offsetting outside investments.
In order to decide whether "right censoring" of this sort affects our
results, we reestimated a Tobit model allmving for both left and right
censoring. This analysis suggests an even larger estimate of the gender
effect-a 19 percentage point differentiaL" This effect is large, equaling
in magnitude that of a woman having 48 percent less salary than an otherwise comparable man!
This finding is probably too large to be credible, based on additional
evidence supplied by the survey. In particular, workers were asked
whether they would prefer another investment option. Overall, about a
quarter of all participants said "yes" with the same fraction of "yes" responses for those contributing only to the least risky fund, while 32 percent of workers contributing to the most risky portfolio said "yes." A
better question for our purposes would have been, "Would you have invested in a less (more) risky option had that been available?" Nonetheless, the relatively low percentages of positive' responses suggest few
workers at the extremes were truly constrained in their investrnen t portfolio options.
The economic importance of our findings is ascertainable using the
data in Table 2. We calculate how much larger would be a man's pension
account at retirement than a woman's, assuming equality of all relevant
factors except the percentage of their two pensions held in stock. Among
women who invested part of their pension portfolio in stock, the modal
percentage of their contributions invested in stock was 20 percent. We
use the estimated difference in the percentage of contributions invested in stock for men and women of 14 percentage points. We assume
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Pension Assets at Retirement Resulting from
Gender Differences in the Percentage of
Pension Contributions Allocated to Stock
Years
in the Plan

Male/Female
Portfolio Size

10

20

1.04
1.08

30
35

1.16

1.13

Source: Authors' calculations.

a 5 percent nominal wage growth over the career, no portfolio rebalancing, and that each year the stock and bond portions of the portfolio
earned the average rate of return received over the period 1926 to 1994
on large company stocks (10.4 percent) or on long-term corporate
bonds (5.4 percent) (Ibbotson 1995).
The effect on the plan's account balance of the gender difference in
portfolio allocation increases with the number of years in the plan as
shown in Table 2. With 20 years' participation in such a plan, the pension
accumulation is about 8 percent larger for men; after 35 years of plan
participation, the man's plan would be 16 percent larger.

Conclusions
Using a survey of TSP participants, we confirm that women appear to
invest their pension assets more conservatively than men. A large percentage of women invested in the minimum-risk portfolio available to
them. A portion of the pattern is explained by women's lower incomes,
but the result persists after controlling for economic and demographic
variables. Nonetheless, married women also invest less in common stock
than married men, holding constant age and income. Because lower risk
portfolios have lower expected return, the findings imply that women's
pension accumulations will exacerbate the gender gap in retirement income over time.
Although examining evidence from a single pension plan somewhat
limits the generality of our findings, we believe that data from a single
plan avoids the possibility that unobserved plan or firm characteristics
are confounding our interpretation of individual behavior. 14 Also, by using data on a single plan we can incorporate the plan rules in our analysis. Nevertheless, it is possible that federal workers are more conservative
in their investments than private-sector workers would be. On the other
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hand, federal workers face less risk of layoff, and hence might be more
willing to accept financial risks. In either case, as long as government
employment affects risk taking similarly for both males and females, the
gender comparisons found in our study remain unaffected.
The authors gratefully acknowledge comments from Vickie Bajtelsmit,
Veda Charro, Marcia Goldstein, Olivia Mitchell, Mark Warshawsky, and
Paul Yakoboski. The views expressed here are solely the responsibility of
the authors and do not represent the position of the United States Department of Labor or of the above acknowledged persons.

Notes

1. A 1992 Department of Labor regulation relieves employers sponsoring
participant-directed plans from fiduciary liability related to selection of investments when specific conditions are met.
2. There is a large overlap between 401 (k) plans and savings and thrift plans.
In 1991,98 percent of participants in savings or thrift plans in medium and large
firms were in 401 (k) plans, and 64 percent of participants in 401 (k) plans were
in savings or thrift plans (USDOL 1993).
3. The information reported in this section is taken from Federal Retirement
Thrift Investment Board (1991: 8-69). Even and Macpherson (1993) also found
lower participation rates for women than men in 401 (k) plans in the private
sector.

4. The full survey included part-time workers, postal service workers, and federal workers in the Civil Service Retirement System, but we restrict the analyses
below to full-time federal workers in the FERS who contributed part of their
salary to the Thrift Savings Plan.
5. The ceiling has since been lifted and FERS employees can now direct 100
percent of their contributions to any of the funds.
6. A Chow test on OLS regressions indicated it is appropriate to pool the
male and female samples.
7. The association between mortality risk and marital status is particularly
strong. For ages 20 to 49, the unmarried/married mortality factor exceeds the
male/female factor, indicating that the death rate for unmarried women exceeds
that for married men (Trowbridge 1995).
8. There may also be assortative mating if people seek spouses with opposite
risk preferences. In this event, husbands and wives would specialize within the
marriage, with women selecting conservative aspects of the family portfolio and
men selecting more risky assets. A full understanding of gender differences in
risk bearing within the family clearly requires data with information on the characteristics of spouses and on other family investments. Because of the complicating factor of marriage in interpreting gender differences in risk bearing, it might
be thought that gender differences would best be estimated for a sample of unmarried workers. However, such a sample would likely be subject to selectivity
bias, with single men and single women differing from married men and married
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women in their attitudes toward risk. To evaluate this possibility, we also interacted gender with marital status in a multivariate model, but that variable was not
statistically different from zero.
9. Other variables were entered in regressions (see Table 3) but were insignificant, including age at hire, tenure with the government, years to eligibility for
retirement, years to eligibility for a retirement supplement (generally requiring
more years of service), and dummy variables for being within five or ten years of
eligibility for either type of retirement benefit.
10. We investigated the effect of short tenure in the plan by entering dummy
variables for one or two years of tenure. We also interacted the tenure term with
gender under the hypothesis that women might be more likely to enter the plan
lacking knowledge, but then would increase their risk bearing as they became
more knowledgeable. In a separate regression, we entered a variable for participation in the plan in 1987, and thus having faced the requirement that all contributions be invested in the G fund. None of these variables was statistically
significant.
11. The Tobit estimation procedure assumes that some of the women's zero
allocations to the stock fund would have been negative, if this were possible (see
Table 4).
12. An additional constraint is that no more than 60 percent of the portfolio
can be invested in the C or F funds. In the analysis sample, 14 percent of the men
and 7 percent of the women were affected by this constraint. .
13. See Table 4. The Tobit procedure assumes that errors are normally distributed. We relaxed this assumption by reestimating the model assuming first a Weibull then a Gamma distribution. The parameter estimates proved insensitive to
the distributional assumption and are presented only for the familiar Tobit
model.
14. This point was made for age differences in the analysis of single-plan data
by Kusko, Poterba, and Wilcox (1994).

TABt.E 3 Estimates of the Effect of Gender on Portfolio Investment Decisions

Variable
Male
Ln (Salary)
Ln (Other Income)
Age
Married

-2 Log Likelihood
I

Slock or Fixed
Income

.411
(.19)
.584
(.18)
.060
(.02)
.002
(.01 )
-.544
(.21)
850.07
617

Slock Only

Fixed Income

.584
(.23)
.931
(.21)
.057
(.03)
-.011
(.01)
-.520
(.24)
669.33
498

.616
(.30)
.252
(.27)
.054
(.03)
-.030
(.01 )
-.237
(.30)
450.81
498

Nole: Asymptotic standard errors in parentheses for Logit models, standard errors for OLS.
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TABLE 4 Multivariate Estimates ofTSP Participants
Dependent Variable:

% of ContriinLtions to Stock Fund
Variable

OLS

Male

4.659
(2.03)
8.928
(1.85)
.553
(.23)
-.071
(.08)
-4.847
(2.19)

Ln (Salary)
Ln (Other Income)
Age
Married
-2 Log Likelihood
R'
F
N

.08
8.12
498

Tobit, Left
Censored

14.855
(4.99)
22.769
(4.61 )
1.438
(.55)
-.281
(.20)
-13.276
(5.24)
2349.00

486

Tobit, Left and
Right Censored

19.424
(6.51)
29.718
(6.08)
1.764
(.72)

-.368
(.26)
-18.493
(6.89)
2068.34

486

Note: Asymptotic standard errors in parentheses for Tobit, standard errors for OLS. The
sample size in the second and third regression is reduced because participants who do not
invest in the C fund but do invest in the F fund were excluded from those regressions.
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